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The majority of poor households in developing countries
rely on subsistence agriculture for their own food production
and as a source of income. Over the past few decades, various
initiatives have been taken aimed at increasing food produc-
tion by closing the technology gap faced by subsistence
farmers. Such initiatives have worked either directly, through
the supply of new technologies such as fertilizer, seeds of
improved plant varieties, or new animal breeds, or more
indirectly, through agricultural extension and advisory
services, or both (Anderson & Feder, 2007; Lunduka,
Ricker-Gilbert, & Fisher, 2013; Rawlins, Pimkina, Barrett,
Pedersen, & Wydick, 2014).
Agricultural extension has long been seen as a key element
in improving agricultural development. However, the eﬀective-
ness of two dominant approaches to agricultural extension
services in particular—Training and Visit (T&V) 1 and Farmer
Field Schools (FFS) 2—has been widely debated. The T&V
approach relies on the “top-down” extension of technical
information, with specialists and ﬁeld staﬀ transferring
knowledge to “contact farmers” in villages, who in turn are
responsible for diﬀusing knowledge into the local community.
As a response to this top-down approach, FFS were developed
as a “bottom-up” approach to extension with a focus on
participatory, experiential, and reﬂective learning to improve
the problem-solving capacity of farmers through highly
trained facilitators working with farmer groups (Anderson &
Feder, 2007). In this paper, we assess the impact on food
security and poverty of an intervention which seeks to com-
bine both the top-down and bottom-up approaches and which
has been implemented among smallholders in northern
Tanzania. The intervention, locally known as RIPAT (Rural
Initiatives for Participatory Agricultural Transformation), is
designed as a modiﬁed FFS approach taking its starting point
in farmer groups and experiential learning, but with a strong
element of traditional technology transfer through the
introduction of a “basket” of new technology options. We ﬁnd
that RIPAT has had a large impact on food security, but no
detectable impact on poverty.843FFS have been implemented and adopted worldwide
(Braun, Jiggins, Ro¨ling, Van den Berg, & Snijders, 2006).
Nonetheless, the ability of the approach to ensure both sus-
tained technology adoption and increased productivity is still
subject to an ongoing debate about appropriate evaluation
methodologies, when to evaluate, and choice of outcome
measures (Braun & Duveskog, 2011; Feder, Murgai, &
Quizon, 2008; Feder, Anderson, Birner, & Deininger, 2010;
Davis & Nkonya, 2008; Mancini & Jiggins, 2008; van den
Berg & Jiggins, 2008). More recently, a thorough survey of
FFS impact studies was provided by Davis, Nkonya, Kato,
Mekonnen, Odendo, and Miiro (2012, Table 1), highlighting
the fact that the outcomes selected for examination are very
mixed, as are the ﬁndings. While some papers ﬁnd positive
impacts on adoption, agricultural yields, productivity, and
agricultural income, others do not. Most papers studying the
impact on various aspects of empowerment ﬁnd that empow-
erment increases, which has led to an argument being
advanced that FFS is more a model of adult learning than
of agricultural extension (Friis-Hansen & Duveskog, 2012;
van den Berg & Jiggins, 2007).
The debate in the FFS evaluation literature was initially
sparked by Feder, Murgai, and Quizon (2004) criticizing ear-
lier FFS evaluation methodologies for not taking the potential
positive bias of non-random program placement and selection
of participants into account in their assessments of impact.
This led to discussions of evaluation timing and problems of
spillover eﬀects. Measuring outcomes using a relatively long
time horizon, as Feder et al. (2004) do, allows for an assess-
ment of impact sustainability—unless the estimated impact is
844 WORLD DEVELOPMENTconfounded by spillovers from FFS graduates to control
farmers living nearby, as suggested by van den Berg and
Jiggins (2007, 2008) but proven by Yamazaki and
Resosudarmo (2008) not to be the case using the same data
as Feder et al. (2004).
The best way to obtain an unbiased estimate of impact
would be to conduct a randomized controlled trial, but to
our knowledge, this has not been done for FFS yet. Given
non-random program placement, a few papers, including
Godtland et al. (2004), Rejesus, Mutuc, Yasar, Lapitan,
Palis, and Chi (2012), Davis et al. (2012), and Todo and
Takahashi (2013), do attempt to take this selection factor into
account in a careful manner. However, all four of these studies
suﬀer from having relatively small sample sizes (ranging from
142 to 486 within each country), which may have resulted in
no signiﬁcant impact being found simply due to lack of statis-
tical power, and from operating with a very short time horizon
(one to two years since project start). They therefore have to
assess the impact on outcomes that are very closely related
to project activities, such as knowledge transfer, technology
adoption, yields, or agricultural income. 3 Again ﬁndings are
mixed, though with some indications of improved technology,
knowledge transfer, and adoption leading to higher yields and
thus to increased agricultural income.
While it is of value to assess the impact of FFS on farmers’
knowledge, technology transfer, take-up, and agricultural
production, it should be kept in mind that households may
simply divert resources away from other activities toward
the new project-related activities. It is therefore also important
to analyze the impact on broader welfare indicators for the
participating households. Although it has become popular to
assess empowerment, it is not in itself a welfare measure;
rather, it can be a channel through which people may obtain
improved welfare. We have not found any studies within the
conventional peer-reviewed literature that analyze the impact
of FFS on broader welfare factors such as food security or
poverty.
This paper is intended to contribute to ﬁlling this gap in the
literature by presenting a rigorous impact evaluation of
RIPAT FFS to examine whether the program improved food
security and reduced poverty among participating households.
In our evaluation, we have sought to address the main points
raised in the FFS evaluation debate summarized above.
We let the original project documentation guide us in the
choice of outcome measures. It was explicitly stated that the
overall development objectives of the intervention were to
increase food security and alleviate poverty among participat-
ing households. Any eﬀect on these outcome measures can
only be expected to be observable in the medium or long term,
as participating households have to ﬁrst adopt and then
implement the new technologies throughout a full agricultural
cycle before impacts on food security and poverty can occur.
By developing our evaluation strategy and the associated
survey instrument accordingly, we have eﬀectively tied the
analysis—and our hands—to these outcome measures, and
thereby reduced the possibilities of “cherry-picking” conve-
nient results. However, we did not have a full pre-analysis
plan laid out, as suggested by Casey, Glennerster, and
Miguel (2012).
In explaining our choice of impact assessment methodolo-
gies, we discuss the extent to which we can overcome the
potential endogeneity issues noted by Feder et al. (2004) and
Godtland, Sadoulet, Janvry, Murgai, and Ortiz (2004) that
stem from non-random program placement and self-selection
of participants. To address these issues we collected household
data from two diﬀerent areas: Arumeru district, where RIPATI was implemented, and Karatu district, where RIPAT II was
started two years later. In both areas we collected data from
virtually all RIPAT households and from a sample of control
households in nearby villages. In addition, we also collected
data from non-RIPAT households in RIPAT I villages. We
employ four diﬀerent methodologies to assess the impact of
RIPAT I: a simple cross-sectional comparison of RIPAT I
and control households in a multivariate setting to control
for observable characteristics; an intention-to-treat estimation,
in which we include non-RIPAT households within RIPAT I
villages, to circumvent the problem of self-selection at the
household level; a matching estimation to increase compara-
bility of observable characteristics between RIPAT I and con-
trol households and villages 4; and ﬁnally a Quasi Diﬀerence-
in-Diﬀerence estimation exploiting data from the later RIPAT
II households and their controls to account for selection.
Under the assumption that the household- and village-level
selection mechanisms in the two districts were the same, the
Quasi Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence takes selection on both obser-
vable and unobservable characteristics into account, i.e., we
circumvent the endogeneity problems of non-random program
placement and self-selection of participants. To the extent that
there was already some initial impact among RIPAT II
farmers on food security and poverty indicators at the time
of the data collection in 2011, which was more than one year
after RIPAT I completion and half way through the RIPAT II
project period, our impact assessment will be a conservative
estimate of the true impact. We thereby avoid the problem
of positive selection bias. Throughout the paper, the impact
assessment is an assessment of RIPAT I only, unless explicitly
stated otherwise.
To address the potential problem of timing and spillover to
control farmers diluting the impact of the intervention, as
described by van den Berg and Jiggins (2008), we use control
farmers living at a suﬃcient distance from the RIPAT inter-
vention villages. Although there had been spillover within
RIPAT I villages at the time of data collection, qualitative
ﬁndings conﬁrm that we do not have to worry about any
potential spillover in food security and poverty from RIPAT
I to control villages at the distances used. 5 In addition, by
assessing the impact of RIPAT I almost ﬁve years after project
start and more than one year after completion, we are
also able to address issues of sustainability, at least in the
medium term.
Our analyses are based on interviews with 2,041 farming
households using a highly structured closed-form question-
naire administered in 36 villages, of which 16 were interven-
tion villages. We thus have a large sample size compared to
previous FFS impact evaluations. 6
The vast majority of participants in RIPAT Farmer Field
Schools were involved in the project throughout the full pro-
ject period. We see that half-way through the project period
in RIPAT II and one year after project completion in RIPAT
I the participating households were more likely to have
adopted virtually all the key technologies promoted through
the basket of options than farmers in the control villages. This
indicates both immediate and sustained adoption of the new
technologies. We ﬁnd that the participating households were
more likely to be cultivating improved varieties of banana,
to have a larger degree of crop diversiﬁcation, to be keeping
improved breeds of livestock, and to be members of savings
groups.
Most importantly, we ﬁnd that these high levels technology
take-up resulted in considerable improvements in food
security levels, suggesting an increase in overall household
welfare. In the medium term, i.e., ﬁve years after project start,
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points less likely to experience hunger, that their diet con-
tained more animal proteins, and that their children were
more likely to have at least three meals per day. These are sub-
stantial impacts, which we believe will be sustainable in the
longer term, given the timing of the evaluation.
We do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant impact of RIPAT I on any of
our poverty indicators occurring by 2011. This suggests that
RIPAT I households might have had a more urgent need to
overcome food insecurity than to invest in the more material
goods that are typically used as poverty indicators, e.g., good
ﬂoors or mobile phones. We analyze two possible mechanisms
that might have led to our results: reallocation of labor
resources toward own agricultural production and production
smoothing over the agricultural cycle. We ﬁnd indications of
both.
We have organized the paper as follows. Section 2 describes
the RIPAT intervention, and Section 3 presents the data: sum-
mary statistics for household and village characteristics, par-
ticipants, adoption of technologies, and choice of outcome
measures. In Section 4 we explain our evaluation strategy,
while we turn to the results in Section 5. We analyze the role
of labor reallocation and production smoothing in the ﬁndings
in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.2. THE INTERVENTION
In this paper we evaluate the agricultural project RIPAT I,
but for some elements of the evaluation strategy we also
exploit data from a later project, RIPAT II. Both projects
were implemented by a local Tanzanian NGO, RECODA.
They targeted small- and medium-sized farmers in rural vil-
lages with at least one acre and in principle no more than ﬁve
acres of land. Village leaders were asked to form two groups of
30–35 farmers in each village and to assist the groups in get-
ting access to a joint group ﬁeld. Membership was voluntary.
RECODA explained to village leaders that members should
not be rich in terms of the wealth ranking of the village, had
to be committed to active participation (attendance records
were kept and strict rules enforced), had to be willing to share
their knowledge with and demonstrate agricultural techniques
to their fellow villagers and should therefore be of good stand-
ing in the community, and had to live within the village admin-
istrative area. Furthermore, the leaders were told that each
group should have an equal number of men and women and
only one member per household (Maguzu, Ringo, &
Vesterager, 2013). The two RIPAT projects were each imple-
mented in eight villages; these were selected by district oﬃcials
as being the poorest villages in the given district.
There were thus two sources of endogenous selection into
the project. One was endogenous village selection: since pro-
gram placement was not random and if district oﬃcials fol-
lowed the guidelines given to them, RIPAT villages were less
wealthy than the other villages in the district at the outset of
the project, i.e., there was a negative selection eﬀect. Secondly,Figure 1. Timeline of RIPAT psince participation was voluntary, households self-selected
into the project (provided they met the targeting criteria)
and hence we would expect participating RIPAT households
to have been more motivated than other households, resulting
in a positive selection eﬀect. The sign of the net selection eﬀect
thus cannot be assumed a priori.
The RIPAT Farmer Field Schools draw on a bottom-up
experiential and reﬂective approach to learning and practical
demonstrations of farming techniques, as do most FFS. How-
ever, they are described as less participatory and more top-
down than other FFS approaches (Aben, Duveskog, &
Friis-Hansen, 2013). A key diﬀerence is a strong element of
traditional technology transfer through training in a predeter-
mined but locally adapted “basket of technology options”,
rather than in just one technology. These agricultural technol-
ogy options are chosen by the implementing NGO on the basis
of their strong agricultural expertise and in prior consultation
with the villages in question. By equipping the farmers with
the necessary information, knowledge, and hands-on experi-
ence in the use of diﬀerent relevant and eﬃcient technologies,
the program provides each farmer with the means to choose
which technologies to adopt in his or her own agricultural pro-
duction. Each group meets weekly at its demonstration plot or
group ﬁeld. At these meetings, progress is followed and dis-
cussed throughout the agricultural cycles. The crops and tech-
nologies introduced in the “basket of options” are very diverse
and cannot all be fully introduced in a single agricultural cycle
as in typical FFS programs; the implementing NGO therefore
works with the RIPAT FFS for a three-year period, after
which the farmers “graduate”. The standard “basket” includes
improved varieties of banana with new cultivation techniques,
conservation agriculture and crop diversiﬁcation, improved
animal husbandry, fruit and multipurpose trees, soil and water
conservation, post-harvesting technologies, and encourage-
ment to participate in savings groups. However, the basket
is always adapted to suit local conditions, taking into account,
for example, soil, water, and climate. 7
The two RIPAT FFS projects commenced two years and
four months apart in two districts in the Arusha Region.
The implementation of RIPAT I in Arumeru District was
from May 2006 until the end of 2009, while RIPAT II was
implemented in Karatu District from September 2008 until
August 2012 (see Figure 1). The implementation strategies
for the two projects were the same except for minor adjust-
ments to the content of the basket of options. 8 We exploit this
gradual roll-out in one of our empirical strategies below to
address the potential problems caused by self-selection of par-
ticipating farmers and non-random program placement at vil-
lage level due to unobservable factors.3. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
In January 2011 we conducted a large-scale quantitative
household survey in both RIPAT and control villages in the
two intervention districts. This was one year after completionrojects and data collection.
Table 1. Summary statistics for background characteristics
All Arumeru Karatu
RIPAT I Non-RIPAT Control RIPAT II Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Acres 2006 3.04 3.29 2.95 3.02 3.03 2.90
(1.69) (1.78) (1.74) (1.72) (1.61) (1.61)
Head less than seven years educ. 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.28 0.41
(0.47) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.45) (0.49)
Head more than seven years educ. 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04
(0.22) (0.26) (0.24) (0.24) (0.20) (0.19)
Age of head 46.82 48.19 44.97 46.32 45.72 48.58
(14.45) (13.57) (16.10) (16.06) (11.53) (15.21)
Head is female 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.07 0.16
(0.35) (0.40) (0.35) (0.39) (0.26) (0.37)
Number of children of head 1.73 1.49 1.32 1.35 2.37 1.86
(1.55) (1.31) (1.34) (1.33) (1.68) (1.70)
Good at math 0.36 0.41 0.36 0.38 0.36 0.31
(0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.46)
Participation in other projects 0.16 0.27 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.09
(0.37) (0.45) (0.33) (0.37) (0.35) (0.29)
Household rainfall, mm/year 818.59 751.26 749.53 703.84 930.23 905.28
(106.97) (53.99) (54.38) (41.29) (50.83) (61.30)
Village distance to market, km 8.53 9.59 10.09 5.43 8.42 8.98
(4.83) (3.68) (3.71) (4.86) (5.96) (3.93)
Village has secondary school 0.68 0.60 0.65 0.88 0.63 0.67
(0.47) (0.49) (0.48) (0.33) (0.48) (0.47)
Village hosted devel. project 0.51 0.63 0.70 0.39 0.36 0.49
(0.50) (0.48) (0.46) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50)
Observations 2,041 420 335 359 491 436
Notes: Means (and standard deviations) of household and village characteristics for all households in the sample are shown in Column (1) and for subsets
of the sample in Columns (2)–(6). The means are unweighted. Since non-RIPAT households are overrepresented in some villages, the village level means
diﬀer slightly between Columns (2) and (3).
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RIPAT II. We used a highly structured closed-form pilot-
tested questionnaire to capture the extent to which participat-
ing farmers had adopted the technologies introduced through
the RIPAT farmer groups and to discover whether this in turn
had had an impact on their food security and poverty levels
relative to farmers in control villages. A selection of non-
RIPAT households were also surveyed in the RIPAT I villages
in order to gather data for separate diﬀusion analyses of the
more popular technologies. 9 We interviewed a total of 2,374
households in 36 villages; of these, 2,041 households are
included in the analyses in this paper. 10 The bottom row of
Table 1 shows how these households are distributed across
RIPAT I and II and their respective control households, as
well as the stratiﬁed random sample of non-RIPAT house-
holds surveyed in RIPAT I villages. We aimed at interviewing
all the farmers who originally signed up for the RIPAT
Farmer Field Schools, including those who later dropped
out—provided they had remained in the village. In Arumeru
district, 90% of the original RIPAT I farmers were inter-
viewed, and 96% of the RIPAT II farmers were interviewed
in Karatu district.
In each household, an interview was conducted with the per-
son mainly responsible for agricultural decisions, often the
head of the household. However, in RIPAT households, the
person interviewed was always the RIPAT group member,
who typically was the head or spouse of the head. The project
aimed at achieving gender balance in the RIPAT farmer
groups, which resulted in a larger share of female-headed
households among the RIPAT farmers than otherwise in thevillage. The same degree of overrepresentation of female-
headed households was sought among the control households.
A village-level questionnaire was administered to representa-
tives of each village government as a supplement to the house-
hold interviews. We thus have household- and village-level
information in the data.
Table 1 lists means (and standard deviations) for the house-
hold- and village-level variables. Column (1) presents the aver-
ages for all households in the data, while the remaining
columns represent subsets of the data used for diﬀerent analy-
ses. Columns (2) through (4) provide data for Arumeru district
and Columns (5) and (6) for Karatu district. Column (2)
shows data for households in RIPAT I, Column (3) has
non-RIPAT households in RIPAT I villages, and Column
(4) shows the averages for the households used as control
households for RIPAT I. Columns (5) and (6) present data
for RIPAT II households and their control households respec-
tively.
It can be seen from Column (1) that the households included
in the analysis generally had around three acres of land, that
the majority of household heads had completed seven years
of primary school, and that heads were typically middle-aged
males with between one and two children living at home. We
tested the farmers’ math skills with two simple math prob-
lems 11; 36% answered correctly. 16% of the households had
participated in other development projects in the past. We also
included the average historical rainfall level at 1:1 km resolu-
tion based on the household’s GPS coordinates from second-
ary data, 12 since these households mainly rely on rain-fed
agriculture. There is a large diﬀerence between the two
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than Arumeru.
At the village level, we see that the average distance from
each village to its most important market for agricultural
output was eight kilometers, that two-thirds of the villages
had secondary schools, and that half of the villages had hosted
a development project in the past.
In the main part of the analyses below, we will be comparing
RIPAT I households to control households from Arumeru
district. It is therefore important that these are indeed compa-
rable in terms of observable characteristics. We ﬁnd that the
two groups are well balanced; the only characteristic in Table 1
that diﬀers signiﬁcantly between RIPAT I and control
households is whether the household had participated in
another development project in the past, tested at the 5% level
with clustered standard errors.
In general, we cluster standard errors at the village level, as
this is the most conservative approach when testing against the
null hypothesis of no impact. However, this implies that we do
not have enough degrees of freedom to include all the
household and village characteristics shown. For consistency,
we control for the log of acres, education, age, age squared,
and gender, and for all village characteristics, in all speciﬁca-
tions. 13 In Appendix B, we present regression results corre-
sponding to the analyses below, where all characteristics are
included and standard errors are clustered at the sub-villageTable 2. Who particip
Comparison households Non-R
(1
Log acres 2006 0.2
(0.1
Head less than seven years educ. 0.2
(0.2
Head more than seven years educ. 0.2
(0.3
Age of head 0.16
(0.0
Age of head, squared/100 0.13
(0.0
Head is female 0.3
(0.2
Number of children of head 0.0
(0.0
Good at math 0.26
(0.1
Participation in other projects 0.83
(0.2
Household rainfall, mm/year 0.0
(0.0
Village distance to market
Village has secondary school
Village hosted devel. project
Constant 4.4
(2.0
N 75
Notes: Logit estimates with a RIPAT I household
consist of households within RIPAT I villages in C
households in Columns (2) and (3). Standard errors in
* Signiﬁcance level is denoted by 0.1.
** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by 0.5.
*** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by 0.01.level instead. 14 The inclusion of all household characteristics
does not alter the results markedly.
(a) Who participated?
We know that the RIPAT project was not randomly allo-
cated and it is interesting to take a closer look at the sources
of selection: self-selection of households within villages, and
non-random program placement across villages. Table 2 pre-
sents estimates from a logit regression of whether or not a
household participated in RIPAT I on household and village
characteristics. In Column (1) we compare RIPAT I house-
holds with non-RIPAT households in RIPAT I villages, which
isolates self-selection of households. We can see that RIPAT I
household heads were typically older, better at math, and their
households more likely to have participated in other projects
in the past. The last two points suggest that RIPAT I house-
holds were more entrepreneurial than non-RIPAT house-
holds, as we expected, which could lead to a positive bias in
the impact assessment. In Column (2), we compare the house-
hold characteristics of RIPAT I and control households and
ﬁnd that the same diﬀerences persist. In addition, RIPAT I
households were more likely to be female-headed and received
more precipitation than the households in control villages. We
include all households ever enrolled in RIPAT I, even if they
later dropped out. This is done to ameliorate the issue ofated in RIPAT I?
IPAT Control Control
) (2) (3)
18 0.091 0.091
7) (0.22) (0.30)
38 0.219 0.663**
5) (0.29) (0.34)
16 0.038 0.322
3) (0.36) (0.36)
3*** 0.112*** 0.177***
5) (0.04) (0.05)
8*** 0.100** 0.162***
4) (0.04) (0.04)
35 0.335* 0.257
4) (0.20) (0.22)
30 0.107 0.035
7) (0.08) (0.11)
7* 0.066 0.135
5) (0.21) (0.27)
0*** 0.494** 0.236
1) (0.24) (0.37)
00 0.024** 0.021***
0) (0.01) (0.01)
0.335***
(0.12)
3.191**
(1.32)
2.359*
(1.33)
50** 20.185*** 20.706***
9) (7.53) (5.47)
5 779 779
indicator as the outcome variable. The samples
olumn (1), and of RIPAT I and their control
parentheses are clustered at the sub-village level.
848 WORLD DEVELOPMENThousehold selection, and we consider this to be the most con-
servative approach.
In the last column of Table 2, we add village characteristics
to the regression. We see that RIPAT I villages were further
away from their main markets, less likely to have a second-
ary school and more likely to have hosted a development
project in the past. These diﬀerences all point to RIPAT I
villages being less wealthy than the control villages, conﬁrm-
ing the accounts from the original project documentation.
This suggests that we might underestimate an impact when
comparing the two. With respect to household characteris-
tics, the diﬀerence in the likelihood of having participated
in a development project is absorbed by the corresponding
village-level diﬀerence. In addition, when we control for
village-level characteristics, we ﬁnd that heads of RIPAT I
households were better educated than heads of control
households, supporting the suggestion of positive self-selection
of households into RIPAT I.
In Section 4 we present the four evaluation methodologies
we employ to address household and village selection on the
basis of observable and unobservable characteristics.
Finally, we note that among the RIPAT I participants who
initially enrolled in the RIPAT FFS, there was a high level of
engagement: the vast majority stayed with the project through-
out the three-year project period. In RIPAT I, more than 80%
of the participants graduated, and the picture is similar for
RIPAT II. It should be noted that participating in RIPAT
FFS is rather time-consuming. Attendance rules were strictly
enforced, and the need to attend is given as the main reason
for dropping out by those who left the RIPAT farmer groups
(Lilleør et al., 2013). 15
(b) Technology adoption
The next obvious question is to examine whether or not
RIPAT farmers also adopted on their own farms the technol-
ogies introduced through the RIPAT farmer groups. Farmers’
engagement in project activities and the decision to allocate
household resources (labor and land) toward adopting the
proposed crops, livestock, and new agricultural practices are
in themselves indicators of project implementation success,Table 3. Summary statistic
Arumeru
RIPAT I Control
Improved banana 0.69 0.12
(0.46) (0.33)
Number of crops in 2010 5.62 4.76
(2.30) (2.22)
Fruit tree(s) 0.66 0.56
(0.48) (0.50)
Improved poultry breeds 0.27 0.02
(0.44) (0.14)
Improved goat breeds 0.40 0.15
(0.49) (0.36)
Improved pig breeds 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Zero grazing 0.30 0.29
(0.46) (0.45)
Savings 0.23 0.03
(0.42) (0.18)
Observations 420 359
Notes: The table shows the means (standard deviations) as well as the p-value
clustering at the village level.but they also represent a prior and necessary condition for
ﬁnding any impact on broader welfare indicators as an out-
come of the intervention.
We examine technology adoption among participating
farmers in both RIPAT I and RIPAT II, since participants
in the latter project had also been exposed to the full set of
technologies examined here by the time of the survey in
2011. Because the basket of options entails a myriad of tech-
nologies and other elements (Maguzu et al., 2013), we have
focused the analysis on six of the main components. We use
simple means to indicate whether, relative to their control
households, RIPAT I and II households were more likely to
have adopted improved banana cultivation, to use more crop
diversiﬁcation, to grow fruit trees, to keep improved breeds of
small livestock, to practice zero-grazing in their livestock hus-
bandry, and to participate in savings groups (which was
encouraged by RECODA).
In Table 3, we list the means (and standard deviations) for
these key adoption measures for RIPAT I and II households
and for their respective control households in the two districts,
Arumeru and Karatu. Around two-thirds of the RIPAT
households were found to be growing an improved banana
variety. On average, they were growing around six diﬀerent
types of crop. About half had fruit trees, a quarter of them
kept improved poultry breeds, 20–40% kept improved breeds
of milking goats, and non-negligible fractions practiced zero
grazing and were members of local savings groups.
To see whether there were signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
RIPAT and control households in the two districts, we carried
out a series of cluster-robust t-tests for the diﬀerence being
zero. A quick glance at the associated p-values shows that
both the RIPAT I graduate households and the RIPAT II
households had adopted all the analyzed components of the
basket of options to a signiﬁcantly greater extent than the
households surveyed in the control villages. Only zero-grazing
restrictions and the use of fruit trees seem not to have caught
on in any signiﬁcant way in RIPAT I compared to the control
villages in this simple bivariate setting. 16 It should be noted
that improved pig breeds were introduced only in RIPAT II.
This suggests that there was a considerable degree of take-
up of the proposed technology options among the RIPATs for adoption measures
Karatu
(p-Value) RIPAT II Control (p-Value)
0.00 0.64 0.01 0.00
(0.48) (0.08)
0.02 6.65 4.69 0.00
(2.71) (2.12)
0.46 0.49 0.28 0.02
(0.50) (0.45)
0.00 0.25 0.01 0.00
(0.44) (0.10)
0.00 0.19 0.05 0.00
(0.40) (0.22)
0.18 0.00 0.00
(0.38) (0.05)
0.93 0.21 0.09 0.02
(0.41) (0.29)
0.00 0.30 0.11 0.01
(0.46) (0.31)
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s of a cluster-robust t-test of the diﬀerences in means being equal to zero,
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take-up could be driven by selection into the project, especially
because the improved varieties of crops and breeds of livestock
did not exist in the area prior to RIPAT.
Furthermore, these take-up rates indicate both that there
was a high level of immediate take-up among RIPAT II farm-
ers, who were only half-way through the project cycle, and
high rates of sustained take-up among RIPAT I farmers,
who at the point of data collection were more than one year
beyond graduation and project closure.
When we analyze the overall degree of take-up, we ﬁnd that
all of the components in the basket of options were adopted by
some farmers. No single element was adopted by all farmers,
although all farmers were growing or keeping at least one of
the promoted crops or animal breeds. This suggests that the
element of choice built into the basket of options was indeed
used by farmers to pick and choose according to their speciﬁc
needs and resources.
(c) Choice of outcome measures
We evaluate the impact of RIPAT on the basis of the devel-
opment objectives that it was intended to improve, as stated in
the original project documentation: namely, better food
security and reduced poverty among the participating house-
holds.Table 4. Summary statistics f
Arumeru
RIPAT I Control
No hunger 0.40 0.29
(0.49) (0.46)
HHS worst month 1.43 1.65
(1.47) (1.46)
HHS best month 0.07 0.04
(0.35) (0.27)
HHS previous four weeks 0.25 0.32
(0.66) (0.73)
At least three meals, worst month 0.63 0.62
(0.48) (0.49)
At least three meals, best month 0.94 0.91
(0.24) (0.29)
At least three meals, previous four weeks 0.87 0.84
(0.34) (0.37)
Meat 0.74 0.69
(0.44) (0.46)
Eggs 0.56 0.36
(0.50) (0.48)
Dairy products 0.87 0.83
(0.34) (0.38)
PPI 44.29 44.68
(14.81) (14.04)
Good quality ﬂoor (not earth) 0.26 0.31
(0.44) (0.46)
Mobile phone 0.68 0.67
(0.47) (0.47)
Rely on casual labor 0.05 0.15
(0.22) (0.36)
Hired labor 0.62 0.49
(0.49) (0.50)
Observations 420 359
Notes: The table shows the means (standard deviations) as well as the p-value
clustering at the village level.(i) Food security measures
To assess the food security situation among the respondent
households, we employed a household level measure capturing
access to food: the “Household Hunger Scale” (HHS). 17 It is
based on three questions asking whether, due to lack of
resources, anyone in the household (1) went to sleep at night
hungry; (2) had no food to eat of any kind in the household;
and (3) went a whole day and night without eating. The
response codes are 0: never; 1: rarely or sometimes; 2: often.
The HHS is simply the sum of the responses to the three ques-
tions resulting in an index from zero to six where zero corre-
sponds to “no hunger” and six corresponds to “severe hunger”.
Due to considerable seasonal variations in the food security
status of households, we take three diﬀerent reference periods
into account—the self-assessed best and worst months in
terms of food security during the previous year, and the last
four weeks prior to the survey. 18 Since this area of Tanzania
is not subject to severe and prolonged periods of starvation,
we would expect to ﬁnd most variation in the measure when
the period of reference is the self-assessed worst month in
terms of food security within the previous year. As it is diﬃcult
to interpret the magnitude of an impact on HHS because it is
an ordinal measure, we also consider the simple binary vari-
able “No hunger”, which is one if the household did not suﬀer
from hunger at any point during the past year according to
HHS and zero otherwise. To see whether children beneﬁttedor development outcomes
Karatu
(p-Value) RIPAT II Control (p-Value)
0.19 0.39 0.39 0.90
(0.49) (0.49)
0.43 1.23 1.23 0.98
(1.25) (1.26)
0.38 0.03 0.03 0.97
(0.24) (0.26)
0.57 0.19 0.32 0.01
(0.53) (0.74)
0.89 0.82 0.82 0.92
(0.38) (0.39)
0.39 0.99 0.98 0.42
(0.11) (0.13)
0.43 0.96 0.95 0.62
(0.19) (0.21)
0.48 0.40 0.39 0.70
(0.49) (0.49)
0.00 0.45 0.38 0.29
(0.50) (0.49)
0.44 0.63 0.60 0.62
(0.48) (0.49)
0.89 32.00 33.49 0.56
(16.41) (14.84)
0.55 0.13 0.11 0.81
(0.33) (0.32)
0.83 0.61 0.56 0.27
(0.49) (0.50)
0.02 0.11 0.20 0.02
(0.31) (0.40)
0.03 0.45 0.33 0.05
(0.50) (0.47)
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s of a cluster robust t-test of the diﬀerences in means being equal to zero,
850 WORLD DEVELOPMENTfrom RIPAT I, we measured their food consumption by look-
ing at the prevalence of households where children had at least
three meals per day during each of the three periods.
Finally, we aim to capture the nutritional quality of the
overall household diet by analyzing whether household
members had meat, eggs, or dairy products to eat during the
previous week.
From the raw averages in Table 4 we see that households in
this region did not suﬀer from food insecurity throughout the
year, but that food insecurity was rather pronounced during
the worst periods of the year, typically the lean season
immediately before harvest. Only 30–40% of households did
not experience any hunger during the worst period of the year.
Similarly, virtually all children had at least three meals per day
during the best part of the year, while on average about a
quarter of the households with children served two meals or
fewer per day during the lean season. Households in Arumeru
seemed to report higher levels of food insecurity than house-
holds in Karatu, but in terms of reported nutritional quality,
the weekly consumption of meat, eggs, and dairy products
was generally lower in the latter district.
A glance at the p-values for the cluster-robust t-tests of
whether there were signiﬁcant diﬀerences between RIPAT
and control households in the two districts reveals that the
raw means of the food security outcome variables are rather
similar when we do not control for selection, household, or
village characteristics.
(ii) Poverty measures
Poverty is a complex outcome to measure. It is a relative
measure, and it depends on local circumstances. Tanzania
operates with a national poverty line of TZS 492 per adult
equivalent per day (or roughly USD 1 per day using Purchas-
ing Power Parity), representing the monetary cost of fulﬁlling
basic needs (Schreiner, 2012).
Household income and consumption levels are notoriously
diﬃcult and time-consuming measures to capture, especially
if this is to be done using a reasonably short survey instrument
(Beegle, Carletto, & Himelein, 2012a, 2012b). We therefore use
an asset-based indicator of poverty as a short-cut. The “Pro-
gress out of Poverty Index” (PPI), as developed by Schreiner
(2012), captures the probability that a household falls below
the national poverty line. The PPI is country-speciﬁc and is
based on ten simple questions that together provide a statisti-
cally strong and simple predictor of whether a household’s
consumption level is likely to be below the national poverty
line as established in the 2007 Household Budget Survey of
10,466 representative households from all over Tanzania. 19
The PPI score ranges from 0 (most likely to be below a poverty
line) to 100 (least likely to be below a poverty line).
We have taken the Progress out of Poverty Index as our key
poverty indicator because it is a widely used measure for iden-
tifying poverty levels and the only one available for Tanzania
at the time of data collection. Schreiner (2012) notes that the
PPI scorecard also aims to measure changes in poverty
through time, and therefore in selecting indicators and holding
other considerations constant, preference should be given to
more sensitive indicators, e.g., ownership of a lantern. How-
ever, it places a lot of weight on more static measures, here fer-
tility and female literacy. 20We have therefore also considered
the two best single predictors of poverty, according to
Schreiner (2012), in isolation; namely the quality of the ﬂoor
in the main dwelling and whether or not the household owns
a (mobile) phone. In Table 4, the raw averages for the poverty
measures show clearly that households in Karatu are on
average poorer than households in Arumeru. 21 There areno signiﬁcant poverty level diﬀerences between RIPAT house-
holds and their respective control households.
Finally, we also examine the supply of casual labor, as this is
often an important source of income for poor households, but
also something that is associated with stigma. It is a possible
channel for RIPAT households to adjust their allocation of
resources, if they can aﬀord to do so; we return to this below.
We see that among the control households, 15–20% relied on
casual labor as one of the most important sources of income;
but also that RIPAT households in both districts relied
signiﬁcantly less on supplying casual labor than the control
households, and were also more likely to hire labor to work
on their farms.4. EVALUATION STRATEGY
In order to estimate the impact of RIPAT on participating
households, we need a good estimate of the counterfactual
situation—of what would have happened to the RIPAT
households had they not participated in the project. We
approach the counterfactual from four diﬀerent angles, which
in diﬀerent ways and to diﬀerent degrees take into account the
participant self-selection and the non-random project
placement at village level.
First, we undertake a simple cross-sectional impact assess-
ment comparing outcomes of RIPAT I households to out-
comes of households in control villages in a multivariate
regression analysis using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). To
the extent that the household and village-level characteristics
included in this multivariate setting do not fully account for
the endogenous selection at household- and village-level, this
simple cross-sectional estimation of the impact may be biased.
It will be upward biased if the farmers that chose to participate
and thus self-selected into the project were more motivated
and entrepreneurial than the average farming household in a
control village, ceteris paribus. It will be downward biased if
the RIPAT I villages were indeed less wealthy than the control
villages prior to project implementation, as suggested by the
project documentation, and if this diﬀerence is not captured
by the village characteristics included in the regressions.
Second, to take household self-selection into account, we
estimate the impact at village rather than household level.
That is, we explore the fact that we have surveyed non-RIPAT
households in RIPAT I villages and estimate the intention-to-
treat (ITT) eﬀect, which pools both RIPAT and non-RIPAT
households in RIPAT villages, since they were all intended
for treatment. This does not give us an estimate of the average
treatment eﬀect among those who initially signed up for the
project, but rather an average village-level eﬀect among all
those who could have signed up. The ITT estimator is free
from self-selection bias and is only biased to the extent that
the village-level characteristics included do not fully account
for the non-random project placement.
Third, to increase the comparability between RIPAT I
households and their control households, we employ a
matching estimator. This allows us to match more closely each
RIPAT I household with a control household that has similar
household and village-level characteristics. More speciﬁcally,
we employ Mahalanobis matching with one nearest neighbor,
which implies that a higher weight is given to control observa-
tions that are similar to RIPAT observations compared to
OLS. 22 In this way, we address the potential bias in the simple
cross-sectional comparison due to unbalanced observables,
but we still rely on the assumption of no selection on unob-
servable characteristics.
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approach exploiting the gradual roll-out of the project.
RIPAT II started more than two years after RIPAT I. RIPAT
II participants were at the time of data collection still one and
a half years away from graduation. Assuming that the selec-
tion mechanisms into RIPAT were the same in the two dis-
tricts at both household and village levels, we can adjust for
this selection in the simple cross-sectional impact assessment
of RIPAT I in Arumeru District by subtracting the diﬀerences
found between RIPAT II and control households in Karatu
District. Doing this in a multivariate regression framework
results in the QDiD estimator, which does not suﬀer from
selection bias. The central assumption here is that the diﬀer-
ences in outcomes due to household and village selection
between treated and control households should be the same
in the two districts in absence of treatment. Examining the
observable characteristics in Table 1 above, we ﬁnd indica-
tions that the RIPAT—control diﬀerences in the two districts
are very similar. Out of the 12 characteristics listed, only two
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the 5% level (age and gender of
head). This QDiD approach is similar to the evaluation strat-
egy initially employed by Coleman (1999, 2006).
Ideally, for the perfect QDiD estimation, our data collection
should have taken place exactly at project start-up of RIPAT
II. The fact that the data collection took place two and a half
years after project start of RIPAT II may result in QDiD
underestimating the average treatment eﬀect, since the high
level of take-up of the diﬀerent components in the basket of
options could already have resulted in a beginning impact
on the broader development outcomes at the time of the sur-
vey. There are three reasons why we are not very worried
about this. First, it is always better to underestimate than to
overestimate, making any signiﬁcant eﬀect found more credi-
ble. Second, during the ﬁrst year of RIPAT II, a severe
drought hit the entire area (both Karatu and Arumeru dis-
tricts) and caused the virtually complete failure of all agricul-
tural activities in the area. The project was therefore in eﬀect
postponed by one year, and project activities were resumed
in the following agricultural season. Third, there is a natural
time lag in both agricultural production and livestock breed-
ing from the adoption of a new technology until its yields
can be harvested, and in any case most households adopt addi-
tional new technologies gradually. 235. RESULTS
To assess the food security impact of RIPAT, we consider
whether households experienced any hunger, their HHS,
whether the children in the households had at least three meals
per day, and whether the households had eaten meat, eggs, or
dairy products during the previous week.
Table 5 is a compilation of the estimated eﬀects. Each col-
umn represents an estimation method, while the rows refer
to diﬀerent outcome measures. Columns (1) and (2) present
estimated coeﬃcients for the RIPAT indicator variable from
cross-sectional comparison regressions and for the RIPAT
village indicator variable from ITT regressions respectively.
Column (3) shows the diﬀerences between RIPAT and control
households from Mahalanobis matching, while Column (4)
gives the estimated impact from the QDiD speciﬁcation. 24
All regressions include village characteristics and the restricted
set of household characteristics, and standard errors are clus-
tered at the village level. The same variables are used for the
matching procedure. In Appendix C, we show the full set of
regressors for the simple cross-sectional comparison and theQDiD regression with the HHS in worst month as the out-
come variable.
In the ﬁrst row of Panel A of Table 5, we show the estimated
impact on the No hunger indicator. Reading across the col-
umns, we see that RIPAT I increased the probability of being
free from hunger by 17–24 percentage points, depending on
the evaluation methodology, with the village level ITT impact
being the lowest, as expected, but still large and statistically
signiﬁcant.
Having taken self-selection into account in the ITT estima-
tion, the remaining worry is whether the impact is driven by
pre-existing village diﬀerences, as the project was not ran-
domly placed. In Column (3) we match on village and house-
hold characteristics, and thereby aim at a better balance of
observables between RIPAT and the control villages and
households. The impact on hunger persists in magnitude but
is not statistically signiﬁcant.
However, there might still be remaining unobserved diﬀer-
ences between villages that we have not fully accounted for,
and we therefore employ the QDiD approach using diﬀerences
between RIPAT II and control households in Karatu to
account for potential selection in Arumeru. Assuming that
the selection mechanisms were the same in the two districts,
this regression provides unbiased estimates of the impact.
The result is reconﬁrmed: RIPAT I households are 24 percent-
age points less likely than their controls to have suﬀered from
hunger when selection is accounted for. The fact that the
QDiD estimate is so close to the estimated impacts from the
other speciﬁcations suggests that selection on the basis of
unobservables did not play a major role. 25
We also analyze the impact on the HHS for three diﬀerent
reference periods, recalling that higher values on the HHS cor-
respond to more severe hunger. Consistently across all four
speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd that RIPAT I signiﬁcantly reduced hun-
ger in the worst period of the year. We do not see any impact
in the best period or the four weeks immediately prior to the
time of the interview. From Table 4 we note that there was
only a little room for improvement, especially in the best
month, as control households in Arumeru had an average
HHS value of 0.04.
The reduction in hunger is associated with an increase in the
number of meals for the children. 26 We see a consistent
impact on the likelihood of having at least three meals in the
best period of the year. This is a signiﬁcant and substantive
impact of seven to 10 percentage points of improvement,
depending on the speciﬁcation. For the worst period we esti-
mate an impact almost double that in magnitude for most
speciﬁcations, but statistically less signiﬁcant. With respect
to the previous four weeks, the picture is more blurred. Taken
together, however, these ﬁgures suggest that participating in
RIPAT not only aﬀected the food security status of house-
holds in the lean period as measured by the HHS, but it also
improved children’s intake of food at other times of the year.
Regarding the nutritional quality of the diet, we ﬁnd that in
general RIPAT I households were signiﬁcantly more likely
than controls to have eaten meat or eggs in the week before
the interview, although the ITT results are weak for meat.
We do not ﬁnd a consistent increase in the intake of dairy
products.
Based on these ﬁndings, we conclude that overall RIPAT I
had a clear impact on food security in terms of reducing hun-
ger, increasing the number of meals provided to children, and
improving the intake of animal protein.
The next question is then whether RIPAT also succeeded in
improving the situation with regard to the other development
objective of poverty alleviation. Turning to Panel B of Table 5,
Table 5. Impact of RIPAT on development outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Simple CS ITT Matching QDiD
PANEL A: Food security outcomes
No hunger 0.208*** 0.172** 0.189 0.238***
(0.052) (0.062) (0.204) (0.063)
HHS, worst month 0.714*** 0.699** 0.723*** 0.809***
(0.193) (0.277) (0.204) (0.226)
HHS, best month 0.004 0.004 0.043 0.023
(0.031) (0.037) (0.052) (0.034)
HHS, previous four weeks 0.146 0.153 0.146 0.046
(0.127) (0.106) (0.126) (0.133)
At least three meals, worst month 0.158* 0.156* 0.083 0.170*
(0.085) (0.089) (0.062) (0.098)
At least three meals, best month 0.069* 0.100** 0.076** 0.065*
(0.038) (0.045) (0.038) (0.037)
At least three meals, previous four weeks 0.106** 0.080 0.070 0.101**
(0.037) (0.057) (0.049) (0.040)
Had meat previous week 0.132* 0.044 0.143*** 0.148*
(0.064) (0.069) (0.042) (0.076)
Had eggs previous week 0.223*** 0.145** 0.189*** 0.163**
(0.044) (0.057) (0.061) (0.065)
Had dairy products previous week 0.068 0.005 0.120** 0.050
(0.072) (0.083) (0.047) (0.092)
PANEL B: Poverty outcomes
PPI 3.472 0.829 0.077 4.047
(2.086) (3.075) (0.050) (3.105)
Has good quality ﬂoor (not earth) 0.002 0.062 1.351 0.006
(0.076) (0.087) (1.481) (0.081)
Has (mobile) phone 0.055 0.063 0.031 0.064
(0.033) (0.037) (0.060) (0.047)
Observations 779 1,114 779 1,706
Notes: Each row represents a dependent variable. Columns (1), (2), and (4) show OLS regression coeﬃcients: Column (1) gives the coeﬃcient to the
RIPAT I indicator in a simple cross-sectional (CS) comparison using data from Arumeru district only; Column (2) gives the coeﬃcient for the RIPAT I
village indicator in ITT regressions including non-RIPAT households from RIPAT I villages, applying inverse sampling probability weights, and using
data from Arumeru district only; Column (3) gives the Mahalanobis matching estimates yielded when RIPAT I households are matched to controls in
Arumeru district; and Column (4) gives the coeﬃcients for the interaction term between the RIPAT dummy and the Arumeru district dummy in the QDiD
speciﬁcation, i.e., these estimations include both RIPAT I and II households and their respective control households in the two districts. Village
characteristics and household characteristics as described in text are controlled for in all speciﬁcations. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
village level. The numbers of observations are reduced for the “Less than three meals” outcomes to 688, 985, 688, and 1,515, respectively for the four
columns.
* Signiﬁcance level is denoted by 0.1.
** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by 0.5.
*** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by 0.01.
852 WORLD DEVELOPMENTthe ﬁrst row shows that we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant impact
of RIPAT on poverty as measured by the PPI. Estimates for
the two additional time-variant indicators which have proven
to be strong individual predictors of poverty status in
Tanzania, quality of the ﬂoor and ownership of a mobile
phone, are also insigniﬁcant. We have also checked for various
degrees of heterogeneity in these results, but the conclusion
remains the same: RIPAT has not had any signiﬁcant impact
on any of these poverty indicators and thus we believe the
overall level of wealth of the participating households to have
remained virtually unchanged.
In order to address potential gender diﬀerences, we split the
results by gender of household head, and a few interesting
ﬁndings emerge. 27 The female-headed RIPAT I households
were more food secure than the female-headed control house-
holds during the best period of the year (suggesting that there
was room for improvement among this subset of households),
and they were more likely to have eggs as part of their daily
diet. However, they were less likely to consume dairy products,
which could be linked to the fact that they were also less likely
to have adopted the improved breeds of milking goats. 286. POSSIBLE MECHANISMS
The fact that we ﬁnd signiﬁcant improvements in food secu-
rity among RIPAT households, but no improvement in their
poverty status, has led us to wonder why this should be so.
One explanation could be that resources were scarce for
RIPAT households at the outset; when they experienced an
improvement in their level of resources, they simply prioritized
more secure and improved food consumption over higher
non-food consumption. We cannot empirically test this any
further, but it would explain the above ﬁnding.
A second explanation could be that households reallocated
their use of labor resources within the household, e.g., shifted
from cash income activities toward own agricultural produc-
tion. This would have meant that the households produced
more food, but earned less cash income, which again could
have resulted in better food security (from own production)
at the expense of lost income. This would make it unlikely that
there would be a positive impact on poverty indicators.
Finally, a third explanation could be that the agricultural
technologies introduced did not increase the total annual
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the agricultural cycle, thereby increasing food security in what
typically would have been the lean period. We analyze the two
last explanations empirically below.
(a) Casual labor
During qualitative interviews, it became clear that in this
local setting casual labor is considered a “last resort”, an
income source turned to when all other options are exhausted
and hence, is greatly stigmatized. However, a reduction in the
supply of casual labor could result in a substantial decrease in
income, since casual labor can be a remunerative income
source for Tanzanian smallholders. 29 We see from Table 4
that casual labor was indeed relatively widespread among
the control households in Arumeru and Karatu districts;
15% and 20% respectively of these households supplied casual
labor as a primary source of income. However, it was signiﬁ-
cantly less prevalent among RIPAT I and II farmers; only 5%
and 11% respectively in these districts relied primarily on
casual labor. 30 This suggests that RIPAT households might
have chosen to cut back on casual labor because they had
experienced an increase in their agricultural income. Such a
cut-back would oﬀset partially or completely any increase in
income from agriculture, but still result in a welfare increase,
because the household would avoid the stigma of supplying
casual labor and at the same time become more food secure.
As to whether households hired labor on their own farms
during 2010, we see from Table 4 that RIPAT households
were 13 and 12 percentage points more likely than the control
households to have hired labor on their own farms in Arumeru
and Karatu districts respectively.
These impacts may not be causal and could be fully driven
by selection, though controlling for household and village
characteristics in a simple cross-sectional comparison only
increases the diﬀerences found and the statistical signiﬁcance.
The ITT estimates are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. 31
This is not surprising, however, as we would expect labor mar-
kets to be local; if RIPAT farmers increased their demand for
casual labor, non-RIPAT farmers in RIPAT villages might
start to rely more on income from casual labor, which would
then even out the village average.
Nevertheless, taken together, the two results are suggestive
in providing a possible explanation for why we ﬁnd a pro-
found impact on food security but no impact from RIPAT
on the poverty measures used. The RIPAT households seem
to have re-optimized the allocation of labor within their
households and begun to invest in their own agricultural
production.
(b) Production smoothing
The agricultural technologies introduced in RIPAT Farmer
Field Schools were selected to enhance production smoothing
over the agricultural cycle. Households generally experience
large seasonal variation in food security, and they do not seem
able to smooth consumption. In the lean period, 70% of the
households in Arumeru control villages experienced some kind
of hunger, while only 2% experienced any hunger just after
harvest. Limited access to proper storage facilities and ﬁnan-
cial markets inhibit the ability of households to smooth con-
sumption. 32 Several elements in the basket of options
introduced by RIPAT are production-smoothing technologies
that provide the households with food even in the lean period.
Banana plants fruit outside of the main harvest season as long
as they receive some water, improved breeds of poultry laymore eggs, and improved breeds of goat produce more milk
all year round than their traditional counterparts. It is there-
fore important to consider whether the impact of RIPAT on
food security was mainly driven by the adoption of these three
production-smoothing technologies that ease the smoothing of
food consumption over the year and thus increase food secu-
rity in the typical lean period.
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 6 show that participation in
RIPAT I and RIPAT II increased the probability of adopting
at least one of the three production-smoothing technologies by
60–65 percentage points, controlling for household and village
characteristics. As discussed in Section 3(b) above, participa-
tion in RIPAT is signiﬁcantly correlated with adopting either
banana cultivation or the keeping of improved breeds of poul-
try or goats. The next two columns of Table 6 present regres-
sions of the HHS in the worst month on a smoothing
technology dummy that equals one if the household adopted
any of the production-smoothing technologies and zero other-
wise, for RIPAT and control households respectively. In both
groups, households using production-smoothing technologies
also experienced signiﬁcantly less hunger than households that
did not use any of the three technologies. This is not necessar-
ily a causal relationship, as the decision to adopt the smooth-
ing technologies was endogenous.
In Column (5) we limit the sample to those households that
adopted any of the production-smoothing technologies and
run the QDiD regression on this sub-sample in order to analyze
whether RIPAT FFS participation brought about any addi-
tional degree of food security. The estimates suggest that
RIPAT households adopting the production-smoothing tech-
nologies achieved the same level of food security as the selected
sample of control households that adopted the smoothing tech-
nologies. However, 82% and 74% respectively of RIPAT I and
RIPAT II households employed such technologies, whereas
this was the case for only 25% and 8% of the control house-
holds in Arumeru and Karatu respectively. In Column (6) we
see the QDiD regression results for the sub-sample of house-
holds not adopting any of the smoothing technologies. Among
these, RIPAT I households experienced less hunger than con-
trols at the 5% signiﬁcance level after taking the selection into
account, suggesting that the impact of RIPAT on food security
was not purely driven by the production-smoothing technolo-
gies; other elements of the basket of options also improved
the food security of households in the lean period. 33
We can thus conclude that although the use of smoothing
technologies is associated with greater food security, the over-
all impact of RIPAT I on food security was not driven solely
by these, as the basket of technology options seems to contain
other elements that are also relevant for the food security of
households not applying the main smoothing technologies.7. CONCLUSION
This is, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst paper which
rigorously analyzes the impact of a locally adapted Farmer
Field School project on broader welfare indicators and devel-
opment objectives, namely food security and poverty allevia-
tion, and not just on intermediate and very project-related
agricultural outcomes, such as technology knowledge transfer,
technology adoption, or agricultural yields from the technolo-
gies promoted.
We ﬁnd that there were strong and sustained positive eﬀects
on food security among the participating households more
than one year after end of project, in terms of access to
food, food consumption, and quality of diet. Participating
Table 6. Smoothing mechanisms
Outcome variable Adoption HHS, worst month
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample RIPAT I RIPAT II RIPAT Control Smooth Non-smooth
RIPAT 0.601*** 0.648*** 0.167 0.344***
(0.07) (0.04) (0.20) (0.12)
Smooth 0.357* 0.369***
(0.18) (0.12)
District 0.654 0.893*** 1.199** 0.745**
(0.56) (0.29) (0.55) (0.27)
RIPAT*District 0.397 0.826**
(0.32) (0.33)
N 779 927 911 795 828 878
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2) is an adoption indicator equal to one if the household had adopted any of the
smoothing technologies; in Columns (3)–(6) it is HHS in worst month. Village characteristics and household characteristics as described in text are
controlled for in all speciﬁcations. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level.
* Signiﬁcance level is denoted by 0.1.
** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by 0.5.
*** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by 0.01.
854 WORLD DEVELOPMENThouseholds experienced less hunger in the lean period, were
more likely to have animal protein in their weekly diet, and
were more likely to give the children in the household at least
three meals per day. We ﬁnd no impact of the RIPAT project
on poverty indicators. There is suggestive evidence that the
positive impacts on food security measures, but lack of impact
on poverty indicators, could be caused by RIPAT households
having prioritized food over non-food consumption, reallo-
cated their labor resources toward improving their own agri-
cultural production, and reduced seasonal peaks and troughs
in food production.
Taken together—and when compared with earlier FFS eval-
uations—these results point to the importance of allowing the
passage of time for assessing outcomes. Although the RIPAT
II farmers, who had completed the project more recently than
the RIPAT I farmers at the time of the survey, were also more
likely than their control farmers to have adopted the full range
of technologies examined, the impacts on food security can
only be expected where the technology adoption has had suf-
ﬁcient time to raise food security levels, which in this case was
among RIPAT I farmers. Timing is thus an important factor
both when considering the length of the project (a typical
RIPAT Farmer Field School runs for at least three years, as
opposed to the one agricultural cycle of standard FFS pro-
jects) and when considering the timing of the impact evalua-
tion and the outcomes selected for examination, allowing
impacts from a change in agricultural systems to materialize.
For instance, although we do not ﬁnd any impact on poverty
indicators, it could be that such an impact will materialize in
an even longer time horizon, when food security is no longer
a concern for RIPAT households. Only time can tell.
A ﬁnal question which may spring to mind concerns the
costs of producing the food security impacts found. The
total cost per participating RIPAT household per year
was USD 200, 34 which is from three to 20 times as high asthe various FFS cost estimates listed in (van den Berg &
Jiggins, 2007). However, it should be borne in mind that
RIPAT projects diﬀer from the typical FFS in that they oﬀer
a full basket of technology options, combine top-down teach-
ing with participatory learning methods, have very close fol-
low-up during the phasing-in period for the new
technologies, and are implemented over a substantially longer
time horizon. Although these key diﬀerences clearly increase
the cost per farmer, we also believe that they are vital to the
impacts found above. None of the existing FFS evaluations
have documented improved food security, so potentially the
extra money was well spent.
Furthermore, apart from the objectives of improved food
security and poverty alleviation among participating house-
holds, RIPAT also has the aim of ensuring that the partici-
pants are willing to share their knowledge with and
demonstrate agricultural techniques to their fellow villagers,
thus increasing the probability of diﬀusion of the improved
techniques within RIPAT villages. A study by Gausset
(2013) highlights the fact that a reasonably high degree of dif-
fusion of the various RIPAT technologies has taken place. In
particular, the improved banana variety has been popular, and
by 2011 it had been adopted by one in eight non-RIPAT farm-
ers in RIPAT I villages (Larsen, 2012). With this focus of
RIPAT FFS on diﬀusion as in conventional agricultural exten-
sion programs, one can argue that the relevant cost–beneﬁt
analysis should be carried out at village rather than household
level. The average cost per household is then only
USD 30, and this expenditure led to an overall outcome of a
17-percentage-point increase in the probability of households
being free from hunger in RIPAT I villages. 35 In comparison,
a large nation-wide community-based child nutrition program
in Ethiopia resulted in an improvement of only seven
percentage points measured on the same household hunger
scale (White & Mason, 2012).NOTES1. This was primarily promoted by the World Bank in the 1970s and
1980s and developed to tackle some of the ineﬃciencies present at the time
in traditional public extension services.2. The Farmer Field School concept was originally developed by the
FAO to promote integrated pest management among Indonesian rice
farmers in the late 1980s, but since then has spread to many countries and
BEYOND THE FIELD: THE IMPACT OF FARMER FIELD SCHOOLS ON FOOD SECURITY 855over the years has been so widely adopted and locally adapted that there is
no longer a single model for either its technical content or the educational
format (van den Berg & Jiggins, 2007).
3. Although Davis et al. (2012) state in the title of their paper that they
analyze the impact of FFS on agricultural productivity and poverty, they
in fact analyze the impact on crop income and livestock income, which
they sum as agricultural income.
4. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting intention to treat and
matching estimation.
5. In RIPAT II there were no reports of spillover within intervention
villages in 2011, let alone to the control villages.
6. We only know of one study, by Davis et al. (2012), with a similar
sample size (1,126 households). However, this is spread across 8–10
districts and three countries.
7. For more detailed descriptions, see Maguzu et al. (2013) and
Vesterager, Ringo, and Maguzu (2013) for shorter and longer accounts,
respectively.
8. Savings group participation was encouraged but not facilitated during
the RIPAT I project. Furthermore, during RIPAT I it became clear that a
more eﬃcient distribution system for the improved breeds of goats would
be needed in future projects. Finally, in Karatu there was an additional
demand for an improved breed of pigs, which was then also included in the
basket of options.
9. The data collection and data entry were closely supervised by us in
cooperation with a survey management team from the Economic
Development Initiative (a Tanzanian survey company). RECODA
assisted in the hiring of a team of local interviewers and data entry clerks.
10. We excluded from the dataset all farmers with more than eight acres
of land and less than one acre of land in 2006 (for RIPAT, non-RIPAT
and control farmers), as these did not comply with the original target
criteria for RIPAT participation (174 households). We capped the acres at
eight rather than ﬁve, as the data show that 17% of the RIPAT farmers did
in fact have more than ﬁve acres of land, but only 6% had more than eight
acres in 2006. Excluding households with more than ﬁve acres from the
analysis below does not change the overall conclusions. We also excluded
all newcomers to the villages (48 households). Finally, we excluded
households with missing observations for any of our variables (111
households).
11. The farmer was considered “Good at math” if s/he correctly
answered both questions, 29  13 = ? and 50/10 = ?
12. We used interpolated data for yearly precipitation measured in mm
from the period 1950–2000 available from http://www.worldclim.org/.
13. When including observations from Karatu, we allow village charac-
teristics to have district-speciﬁc coeﬃcients.
14. Clustering at the sub-village level leads to 52 clusters in regressions
with Arumeru data only, and 130 clusters when all villages are included.
15. In RIPAT I, 77 households dropped out of their farmer groups
before the end of implementation, while in RIPAT II, 96 households
dropped out. All these drop-outs are included in the analyses throughout
the paper and still considered to be RIPAT farmers or RIPAT participants
regardless of when they dropped out.16. When we control for household and village-level characteristics in the
comparison of technology adoption between RIPAT I households and
their control households, we ﬁnd that all the listed adoption measures
were in fact used to a greater extent among RIPAT I households, with
signiﬁcance levels of p < 0.01 or p < 0.05.
17. The HHS is a modern food security instrument developed by US Aid
to ensure cross-cultural comparability. It has been validated in ﬁve sub-
Saharan African countries (Ballard, Coates, Swindale, & Deitchler, 2011).
18. Households were interviewed in January, which is neither immedi-
ately after harvest nor in the worst hungry period, so we expected the
hunger situation in the previous four weeks to have been somewhere in
between the best and the worst months.
19. See Figure A1 in Appendix A for the list of questions used in the
latest PPI measure for Tanzania. Summing the points gives the overall PPI
score.
20. Such measures are often not helpful in analyses of poverty change;
for example, we would not expect RIPAT to aﬀect literacy adult females.
21. District means for PPI, good quality ﬂoor and mobile phone are all
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the 1% level.
22. We have also employed a propensity score matching estimation and
get very similar results. However, we choose to present Mahalanobis
matching estimates to obtain valid conﬁdence intervals (Abadie & Imbens,
2006). All observations are within the common support of the propensity
score.
23. Most RIPAT participants spend the ﬁrst agricultural season learning
about the new agricultural practices at a demonstration plot before they
then in a later agricultural season choose which ones to adopt on their
own farms.
24. This corresponds to the regression coeﬃcient for the interaction term
between the RIPAT indicator variable and the Arumeru indicator variable
in a regression where both indicators are also included separately.
25. To the extent that RIPAT II had already had a (positive) impact on
food security or poverty, we underestimate the impact of RIPAT I.
26. Because some households did not have any resident children, we lose
91 observations in Columns (1) and (3), 129 observations in Column (2),
and 191 observations in Column (4).
27. The results are not shown, but are available upon request.
28. This is consistent with the qualitative gender research among these
women, which highlights the fact that the improved milking goat breeds
introduced in the RIPAT groups were zero-grazing goats, which had to be
fed. Whereas grazing goats is typically a male task in the local context,
collecting fodder and ﬁrewood is a female task. Some female RIPAT
farmers were therefore against keeping the milking goats, as this would
increase the burden of collecting fodder. Later, speciﬁc fodder plants, e.g.,
elephant grass, were introduced to reduce this burden for the women
(Mogensen & Pedersen, 2013)
29. For example, weeding one acre of land pays TZS 2,000, which is four
times the daily national poverty line.
30. Controlling for household and village characteristics only increases
the estimated diﬀerences and the statistical signiﬁcance.
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32. Our results are not driven by access to savings, as they are robust to
controlling for membership of a savings group.33. We reach the same conclusions from a QDiD regression on the full
sample where the RIPAT dummy, the district dummy and their
interaction term are all interacted with the smoothing dummy.34. It should be noted that since the RIPAT interventions described here
were the ﬁrst out of a series of such projects, some piloting costs are also
included.
35. The potential impact on non-RIPAT households need not only come
through increased technology adoption. The analysis above of the demand
for hired labor suggests that RIPAT also brought about increased
economic activity on the local markets, which could have beneﬁcial eﬀects
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Economies, 46(2), 135–150.APPENDIX A. PROGRESS OUT OF POVERTY
INDICATOR (PPI)
The PPI is constructed by Schreiner (2012) based on ten sim-
ple questions listed in what he refers to as a scorecard; see the
example from Tanzania below.
See Fig. A.1.
Figure A.1. Simple poverty scorecard for Tanzania.
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See Tables 7 and 8Table 7. Impact of RIPAT on development outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Simple CS ITT Matching QDiD
PANEL A: Food security outcomes
No hunger 0.203*** 0.155*** 0.224 0.225***
(0.056) (0.055) (0.164) (0.075)
HHS, worst month 0.590*** 0.524** 0.935*** 0.649***
(0.195) (0.211) (0.164) (0.231)
HHS, best month 0.012 0.024 0.013 0.008
(0.050) (0.045) (0.036) (0.050)
HHS, previous four weeks 0.062 0.082 0.172** 0.035
(0.147) (0.118) (0.080) (0.152)
At least three meals, worst month 0.137** 0.143** 0.225*** 0.143*
(0.066) (0.068) (0.071) (0.081)
At least three meals, best month 0.088** 0.133*** 0.050 0.085**
(0.035) (0.036) (0.044) (0.034)
At least three meals, previous four weeks 0.124*** 0.093* 0.103* 0.123***
(0.041) (0.049) (0.056) (0.042)
(continued on next page)
Table 8. Smoothing mechanisms
Outcome variable Adoption HHS, worst month
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample RIPAT I RIPAT II RIPAT Control Smooth Non-smooth
RIPAT 0.567*** 0.650*** 0.051 0.320***
(0.09) (0.04) (0.27) (0.10)
Smooth 0.348* 0.313**
(0.18) (0.12)
District 6.403** 9.356* 3.244 5.194*
(2.45) (5.09) (3.35) (2.90)
RIPAT*District 0.108 0.851**
(0.40) (0.35)
N 779 927 911 795 828 878
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2) is an adoption indicator equal to one if the household has adopted any of the
smoothing technologies; in Columns (3)–(6) the dependent variable is HHS in worst month. Village characteristics (Distance to market, Has secondary
school, Hosted development project in 2006–10, and all three interacted with the Arumeru district dummy) and household characteristics (Log acres in
2006; Household head’s gender, education, math skills, age and age squared; Number of children of head; Whether household has participated in other
project in the past; Historical rainfall, and the last interacted with the Arumeru district dummy) are controlled for in all speciﬁcations. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the sub-village level.
* Signiﬁcance level is denoted by 0.1.
** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by 0.5.
*** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by 0.01.
Table 7—(continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Simple CS ITT Matching QDiD
Had meat previous week 0.173** 0.099 0.156*** 0.174**
(0.066) (0.082) (0.059) (0.077)
Had eggs previous week 0.212*** 0.179*** 0.221*** 0.146**
(0.057) (0.063) (0.051) (0.071)
Had dairy products previous week 0.066 0.019 0.084** 0.033
(0.067) (0.072) (0.042) (0.082)
PANEL B: Poverty outcomes
PPI 0.197 1.087 0.097 0.562
(2.473) (2.767) (0.064) (2.918)
Has good quality ﬂoor (not earth) 0.098 0.131* 2.968* 0.105
(0.062) (0.068) (1.592) (0.068)
Has (mobile) phone 0.027 0.057 0.036 0.039
(0.043) (0.048) (0.048) (0.052)
Observations 779 1,114 779 1,706
Notes: Each row represents a dependent variable. Columns (1), (2), and (4) show OLS regression coeﬃcients: Column (1) gives the coeﬃcient for the
RIPAT I indicator in a simple cross-sectional (CS) comparison using data from Arumeru district only; Column (2) gives the coeﬃcient for the RIPAT I
village indicator in ITT regressions, including non-RIPAT households from RIPAT I villages, applying inverse sampling probability weights, and using
data from Arumeru district only; Column (3) gives the Mahalanobis matching estimates yielded when RIPAT I households are matched to controls in
Arumeru district; and Column (4) gives the coeﬃcient for the interaction term between the RIPAT dummy and the Arumeru district dummy in the QDiD
speciﬁcation, i.e., this estimation includes both RIPAT I and II households and their respective control households in the two districts. Village charac-
teristics (Distance to market, Has secondary school, Hosted development project in 2006–2010, and in Column (4) all three interacted with Arumeru
district dummy) and household characteristics (Log acres in 2006; Household head’s gender, education, math skills, age and age squared; Number of
children of head; Whether household has participated in other project in the past; Historical rainfall (interacted with the Arumeru district dummy in
Column (4))) are controlled for in all speciﬁcations. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sub-village level. The numbers of observations are
reduced for the “Less than three meals” outcomes to 688, 985, 688, and 1,515, respectively for the four columns.
* Signiﬁcance level is denoted by 0.1.
** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by 0.5.
*** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by 0.01.
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See Tables 9.Table 9. Impact of RIPAT on HHS in worst month; all regression coeﬃcients shown
Simple CS QDiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RIPAT dummy 0.226 0.737*** 0.714*** 0.003 0.044 0.096
(0.28) (0.19) (0.19) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13)
Arumeru district dummy 0.422* 0.991*** 1.054***
(0.22) (0.34) (0.34)
RIPAT*District 0.228 0.782*** 0.809***
(0.31) (0.23) (0.23)
Village distance to market 0.044** 0.043** 0.023* 0.023**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Village has secondary school 0.741*** 0.726*** 0.075 0.059
(0.23) (0.23) (0.12) (0.11)
Village had devel. project 0.506** 0.521** 0.197* 0.244**
(0.22) (0.23) (0.11) (0.11)
Village distance to market*District 0.021 0.019
(0.02) (0.02)
Village has secondary school*District 0.816*** 0.784***
(0.25) (0.25)
Village had devel. project*District 0.309 0.280
(0.24) (0.25)
Log acres 2006 0.349*** 0.365***
(0.10) (0.07)
Head less than seven years educ. 0.123 0.130
(0.13) (0.09)
Head more than seven years educ. 0.529*** 0.594***
(0.17) (0.12)
Age of head 0.019 0.022
(0.03) (0.01)
Age of head, squared 0.009 0.014
(0.02) (0.01)
Head is female 0.115 0.038
(0.12) (0.11)
Constant 1.652*** 1.871*** 1.543** 1.229*** 0.880*** 0.472
(0.20) (0.31) (0.70) (0.10) (0.15) (0.39)
N 779 779 779 1,706 1,706 1706
Notes: OLS estimates; Dependent variable is Household Hunger Scale in worst month. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level.
Columns (1)–(3) are based on data from RIPAT I and control households in Arumeru district, while Columns (4)–(6) also include data from Karatu
district. ‘*District’ refers to an interaction term with the Arumeru district dummy.
* Signiﬁcance level is denoted by 0.1.
** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by 0.5.
*** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by 0.01.ScienceDirect
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